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Title: Pathways and prospects in cancer research: Securing futures and 
negotiating boundaries. 
 
Abstract  This paper draws on literature from the sociology of expectations to 
explore accounts of experts in cancer research and clinical practice.  
The cancer specialists’ accounts presented in this article are taken 
from interviews undertaken as part of a project that aimed to develop 
a research agenda for the next ten to thirty years that will achieve 
early detection and prevention in the four main cancers: (i) bowel and 
colorectal, (ii) prostate, (iii) lung and (iv) breast.  Drawing on 
secondary analysis of the interviews, this article provides a 
sociological exploration of both the experts’ versions of the future and 
the interactions between the interviewer and research participant to 
show expectation in the making: the competing stories of what is and 
what ought to be the focus of cancer research now and in the (near) 
future. The building of a cancer research agenda is shown to be a 
contested future, represented by a dominant and resistant view of 
the cancer problem, in which cancer specialists must engage in 
performative strategies and boundary work to frame the present 
problem: what cancer is and how it can be detected and, 
subsequently, to claim credibility for a future pathway.  
 
Keywords:  Futures, sociology of expectations, cancer research, constitution of 
knowledge, boundary work 
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Introduction 
 
In recent years, a growing number of scholars have pointed out the significance of 
expectations in science and technology innovation (Brown and Michael, 2003; Borup 
et al., 2006; Brown et al., 2000; Horst, 2007; Martin, 2015). To this end, 
contemporary biomedical science could be conceived as more of a future-oriented 
activity than a present one.  Indeed, high expectations of a field of research or 
specialism are often required to mobilise scientists and resources in the first place, 
helping to bring together various experts to work towards a common goal (Brown 
and Michael, 2003; Fujimura, 1987). Further, science is conducted under regimes of 
speculation. Of course, science is no single thing in this regard (Gieryn, 1999), it is 
made up of different epistemic cultures (Knorr-Cetina, 1999), styles of reasoning 
(Hacking, 1992) and communities of practice (see Lave and Wenger, 1991). Thus 
certain research areas are intrinsically tied to particular expectations and 
imaginations. Biomedical research, for example, is conceived of differently to some 
other scientific endeavours (for example, theoretical physics) bringing with it 
particular promises and prospects of its future applications and implications 
(Morrison, 2012; Lewis and Bartlett, 2015). Biomedical science operates as a locale 
for individual and collective hopes centring on health.  In attempting to realise these 
hopes, they take on political and economic materiality (Novas, 2006). Therefore, the 
future is itself a resource in biomedical science, often called upon when shaping and 
justifying present scientific activity: for example basic research into stem cell and 
genomic research is expected to lead to clinical interventions (see Charlton and 
Andras, 2005). 
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Brown and Michael (2003) argue that futures are enrolled as resources in the 
present and play a central role in the reception, up-take and legitimation of scientific 
and, ever more importantly, technological innovations.  This work details the social 
effects of expectations, highlighting how representations of the future mobilise 
resources (economic, material and symbolic), stabilise fields attempting to secure 
coherence and reduce uncertainties (Borup et al., 2006; Van Lente, 1993).  It also 
considers the significance of expectations in scripting futures into current scientific 
practice (Akrich, 1992), and of building trajectories and infrastructures for 
prospective developments (Brown and Michael, 2003; Arribas-Ayllon et al. 2010; 
Hedgecoe and Martin, 2003). This article empirically grounds the sociology of 
expectations by reflecting upon a rare set of data which shows expectations in-the-
making in the field of cancer research.  Cancer research itself covers a multiplicity of 
scientific and clinical practices from biological, laboratory-based research to 
intervention studies and clinical trials (Keating and Cambrosio, 2013: Goldstein et al., 
2012).  However, there is increasing investment in base biology (Morange, 2008) as a 
potential path to early detection and prevention (Goldstein et al., 2012); a 
phenomenon being replicated across the biomedical sciences (Armstrong, 2009).   
 
The analysis in this paper highlights the mechanisms, performances and strategies 
(Michael, 2000; Martin, 2015) of United Kingdom (UK) cancer research experts to 
embed and secure particular readings of the future, and the implications of 
expectation discourses for providing legitimacy to future destinations. The analysis 
also builds on the work of Gieryn (1983; 1999) to make connections between the 
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concept of boundary work and the sociology of expectations.  Cancer futures are 
imagined, mobilised and enacted differently by various kinds of experts. In laying 
claim to a particular future, experts simultaneously keep out competing claims and 
trajectories.  As the accounts of cancer experts illustrate, the concept of the future 
presents significant analytical difficulties when attempts are made to separate out 
the many versions of the future at play. Building and sustaining future expectations 
in scientific work requires actors to make claims to authority and resources over and 
above the claims of alternative experts; it necessitates boundary work (Gieryn, 1983; 
1999).   
 
Research context 
 
The article is predicated on secondary analysis of a project undertaken by a 
university-based interdisciplinary collaborative team, funded by the UK Medical 
Research Council (MRC) and Engineering and Physical Sciences Council (EPSRC). This 
original project team consisted of clinical researchers, as well as informaticians and 
engineers with experience of working with clinical information as a resource for 
health improvement and the development of medical technologies.  The study 
sought to set out a research agenda for the next ten to thirty years that would best 
improve the early detection and prevention of the four common cancers: (i) bowel 
and colorectal, (ii) prostate, (iii) lung and (iv) breast cancer.  The aims of this research 
agenda were twofold: to improve technologies and information systems for risk 
prediction; and to identify the most effective clinical measures and indicators for 
predicting the risks of developing disease or deterioration in disease.  
 5
 
As a central tenet of the study, experts were interviewed in order to establish the 
‘state of the art’ for early detection, but also to garner specialist opinion to inform a 
future agenda for the next ten to thirty years in cancer research.  The study team 
envisaged the project as an opportunity for experts to be forward-thinking and to set 
out their ideals for the future.  Experts were encouraged to provide a view of the 
future that was borderless, unrestricted by cost, technical capability or 
organisational structures:  
 
“We are not doing the research, we are setting the agenda for research for the next 
ten to thirty years, so we really, really need innovative thinking and imaginary 
thinking.  We are not restricted by the obstacles we have now.” (The interviewer 
during an Interview with a professor of oncology) 
 
However, how far experts were asked to speculate into the future was not 
borderless and was shaped by the broader research context of the time.  The kinds 
of cancer research being funded during the period between 2007 and 2009 were 
predominantly concerned with the development of risk factors and/or biological 
markers to better predict and prevent disease.  This approach reflected two 
dominant aspects of biomedical research: first, a public health approach to prioritise 
the identification of ‘at risk’ groups within the wider population (Armstrong, 2009) 
and second, a longer standing paradigm shift towards the ‘basic to applied’ model 
maintaining that basic (molecular-biology) research leads to clinical breakthroughs 
(Charlton and Andras, 2005). As a result of this paradigm shift, translation has 
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become an increasingly important but troublesome concept for biomedical science.  
Research has shown the movement of scientific discoveries from bench to bedside is 
socially complex and one that resembles a circuit (Lewis et al. 2014) or a  tangled 
web rather than a deductive chain from bench to bedside (Keating and Cambrosio 
2014).  This is especially true of cancer research.  Nelson et al’s (2014) work 
illustrates how the increasingly ‘bio-marker-driven’ nature of clinical trials is taking 
on the form of experimental science, producing novel biological or clinical insights. 
This complexity is compounded by limited research evidence to inform the utility 
and effectiveness of practical applications (Khoury et al., 2007) of scientific discovery 
and by the resulting distortion of both the science itself and the ethical practice of 
scientific research that can be produced by an emphasis on translation. 
(Maienschein et al., 2007).  Multiple meanings are also ascribed to translation from 
scientists and clinicians alike (Mittra, 2013) stressing the competing values, 
understandings and interests of different experts.  The complexities surrounding 
translation necessitate boundary work from experts to assert the value of specific 
kinds of knowledge, particularly when setting out what constitutes future success in 
the field of cancer research.   
The project’s future orientation was also indicative of the organisational form of 
research gaining momentum in the field of cancer research at the time.  Most 
studies took on the appearance of ‘big science’ (Galison and Hevly, 1992; Hilgartner 
2013) or population studies where large data sets were collated and analysed, 
exploring the molecular-biological characteristics of disease and its progression with 
the aim of trying to predict risk (see for example, The Genetic Lung Cancer 
 7
Predisposition Study; the Molecular Epidemiology study [GELCAPS]; the 
identification of Men with a Genetic Predisposition to Prostate Cancer [IMPACT]; the 
Collaborative Oncological Gene-environment Study [COGs]).   
Secondary analysis: A sociological perspective 
 
This is an especially rare data set. Unlike most interview-based research conducted 
by social scientists, the interviewer in this case is a ‘native’ entrenched in the field of 
clinical research and cancer informatics with a single agenda: to determine what the 
future of cancer research might look like.  The participants are also aware that the 
interviewer (and the project team) will utilise their and other experts’ accounts to 
make recommendations to funders regarding what the research agenda should be, 
how it should be carried out, and who should undertake the work.  These transcripts 
are therefore manifestos for their discipline’s claim to the future of cancer, 
unmitigated by the usual conventions of research interviews with scientists. The 
material explored in this article therefore offers a view, not only into the possible 
futures being enacted in specialists’ accounts, but also into how aspects of 
performativity (Brown et al 2000) manifest in a competitive context, in which experts 
are engaged in staking their claim to the future of cancer research.   
 
The group of experts interviewed represent the ‘core set’ (those actively engaged in 
experimentation and theorisation [Collins, 1999]) in the field) in UK cancer research.  
The original project team, themselves knowledgeable and experienced in aspects of 
cancer research, identified this group of experts as the central protagonists with 
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international influence, who would have significant insight into both the current 
‘state of art’ in cancer research, but also into its future projection.   Out of the thirty 
originally interviewed, ten agreed to a secondary analysis of their interview.  This 
subset was both representative of the original experts consulted by the horizon-
scanning team and of the key fields of expertise shaping cancer research, which at 
this time included geneticists, histopathologists, informaticians and oncologists.   Our 
analysis and interpretations also extend beyond that of the ten transcribed 
interviews.   The original project itself is an exercise is future building and the 
interplay between the cancer experts, the interviewer and the project team is 
sociologically significant in understanding the building of expectations in cancer 
research.  Furthermore, the article draws on the ethnographic engagement of the 
author, herself a member of the project team in the entire study, including being 
present during all interviews, contributing to the synthesising of all generated 
material and being heavily involved in the activities of report writing, networking 
activities and the building of collaborations to set out a future agenda.  Author One 
is therefore fully aware of the original research context and is able to safeguard 
against any distancing between the analysis and the data (Cicourel, 1982). 
 
Importantly, the secondary analysis draws out the processes and negotiations 
involved in accomplishing what is the current knowledge in cancer research and 
what should be the focus for the future.  It is interested in how these are maintained 
or challenged across the disciplinary fields of the interviewer and expert participants.  
The analysis pays particular attention to moments of consensus and contention to 
show the accomplishment of future projection in action.  Attention is paid to both 
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what is said by both interviewer and interviewee and how it is said in order to 
explicate knowledge-producing activities in language (McCarthy, 1990; Lynch, 1993).  
This is not, however, an exercise in critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 2013) of 
‘naturally occurring talk’ (Potter, 1997).  Instead, by examining the content and form 
of the futures represented by the cancer experts, the interviews highlight how 
expectations produce distinct accounts of cancer that afford specific future 
pathways.  The task for the project team undertaking the research was therefore not 
only to establish an agenda for future research, but to choose which particular 
future they wished to collaborate in/on.  As part of this, they attempted to establish 
a consensus; a dominant view of cancer amongst the core set that might promote a 
particular future research agenda.  Such work would stabilise and define ‘the cancer 
problem’ and the field of future cancer research.   
 
Constituting cancer 
 
The purpose of the original project team was to establish a consensus over future 
expectations in cancer research.  A significant component of constructing these 
futures involved the practice of demarcation in the constitution of cancer itself. To 
highlight the contested nature of cancer as a disease entity, the experts’ extracts 
have been organised into two competing views: the dominant view and the resistant 
view. The team’s starting premise, prior to interviewing the cancer experts, was that 
the future of cancer research would focus on pre-symptomatic people at risk of 
developing cancer.  This dominant view presents cancer as a continuum, a 
developing entity in which there is the potential for intervention; a view that 
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promotes early detection, risk prediction, screening and prevention.  This 
perspective was represented in the interviewer’s own contributions, it reflected the 
interests of members of the project team and was shared by many of the experts 
interviewed as the most forward thinking aspect of cancer research happening at the 
time. The dominance of this constitution of cancer amongst the experts and the 
project team is perhaps unsurprising, given the significant investment in large-scale 
prospective studies being conducted in cancer research at the time, of which many 
of the specialists interviewed would have direct involvement.   
 
The interviewing team were also met by a distinct and competing resistant view.  
This outlook constituted cancer not in terms of pre-symptomatic risk, but on the 
basis of a tumour’s aggressiveness and ability to progress and invade once present.  
Such a perspective has been termed resistant because it was held by only a minority 
of the experts interviewed and was not identified by the project team. It also speaks 
against the growing tide of research development in risk prediction and prevention.  
Expectations discourse are shown, in both the dominant and the resistant view, to 
constitute cancer (i) spatially, according to an actor’s proximity to the coalface of 
research and clinical practice, (ii) materially, by the physical tools, techniques and 
practices that make up an actor’s work and (iii) cartographically
1
, by the actors’ 
different disciplinary hinterlands (experts bring with them quite different 
backgrounds with different interests, ambitions, and perspectives see Lewis & 
Bartlett, 2013), and epistemic cultures.  Furthermore, these representations of 
cancer as an entity, and the futures they promote, are shown to mobilise material, 
symbolic and economic resources. We begin with the resistant view: 
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Pussycats and tigers: The resistant view 
 
In the resistant view account, it is the aggressiveness of the tumour that becomes 
the cancer of concern, not the pre-symptomatic one.  
 
I:  “What I understood from you now is, someone may suffer prostate cancer for 
years and years and years and this is silent, this is quiet, more or less this man is 
living a usual or a normal lifestyle, but there is some point where there is a 
deterioration and this deterioration is something we really need to detect.  Am I 
right in my understanding?” 
R:  “Yes, you might be right. So in other words, if you think about the analogy with 
prostate cancer, [it] is the tiger and the pussycat and we say most prostate cancers 
are pussycats you know, they’re harmless, lovable little things, [but] some of them 
are tigers.  It’s the tigers that kill people.  Now the question that you’re asking is, are 
they tigers right from the very beginning, is it once a tiger always a tiger, once a 
pussycat always a pussycat or do pussycats sometimes grow up into tigers.” 
I:  “Yes.”  
R: “And we don’t know the answer to that....So, the urgent need in prostate cancer is 
not so much just to detect it early, because in a sense that’s already starting to 
happen, but it’s to detect the ones that really matter and to differentiate the ones 
that really matter from the ones that don’t matter.”  (Professor of Oncology & 
Palliative Care, Specialist in Prostate Cancer) 
 
Although representative of the resistant view amongst the core set of cancer 
research experts, the analogy of the pussycat and the tiger is well established in 
pockets of cancer research and practice, particularly in prostate cancer (Mason, 
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2009; Kazimierczak and Skea, 2015).  Here, cancer is constituted, in the first instance, 
according to the area of the body it affects, in this case the prostate, and 
subsequently as being of two breeds of the same cat family: (i) tigers, which need to 
be tamed as they are aggressive and can kill, and (ii) pussycats that are already 
tamed – and act as harmless companions. The question that follows is how do we 
deal with the tigers, and can some of the pussycats become feral. If they can, how 
can we detect the signs? The risk therefore derives not from the possibility of 
developing a growth or tumour, but the progression of a particularly aggressive type 
of tumour that does significant harm to the part of the body it invades.  It is less 
about whether one might develop cancer and more about whether one might 
develop a particular breed
2
.   
 
The interviewer and the experts’ approaches to understanding the problem of 
cancer and its possible future solutions are bound by their disciplinary hinterlands. 
The interviewer’s approach is predicated upon an interest in identifying risk factors 
that are amenable to collation and interpretation through information systems and, 
at best, may form the building blocks of an algorithm to predict an individual’s risk 
(explored in more depth in the next section).  Such aims reflect the engineering 
foundation of the field of informatics that values quantifiable measures to inform 
workable solutions
3
.  The expert’s account, on the other hand, is based on the 
materiality of practicing oncology, the variability of presenting tumours, and the 
necessarily pragmatic nature of decision making over the future treatment path of 
cancer patients. This constitution of cancer reflects the expert’s closeness to 
practicing oncology.   
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Contextual differences, even within disciplines help in accounting for an expert’s 
alignment with either the dominant or the resistant view.  Experts within the same 
discipline but working with different materials and in different contexts - a research 
geneticist as opposed to a clinical geneticist for example – can have quite different 
points of view on the cancer problem.  As Haraway (1991) maintains, knowledge of a 
phenomenon is affected by how and where you look, which in turn is influenced by 
where you come from.  Indeed some specialisms are defined by the tools that 
structure their work such as bioinformatics, proteomics or x-ray crystallography (see 
Lewis and Bartlett, 2013; Law, 1973).  These materials vary greatly even within 
seemingly closely related fields: 
 
“When you’re thinking about how you can predict if one person’s cancer is hereditary or 
sporadic, you know, a non-genetic type, this is our job because when you look down the 
microscope, when you look on a mammogram there is no difference as we understand things 
now.   So it’s very difficult to say for certain, you know if someone had then got a triple 
negative breast cancer, you can’t say ‘oh yours must be genetic’.  The best tool at the 
moment, of working out how likely it is that someone’s cancer is genetic, is looking at the 
family tree.” (Senior training consultant in clinical genetics, clinical researcher in cancer 
genetics) 
 
The family tree was described by this clinical geneticist as the most utilised form of 
genetic assessment, and many respondents suggested that this would remain the 
case in the near future.  Such an account also aligns itself to the resistant view, 
suggesting that genetic risk, in the clinic at least, relies on observable occurrences of 
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cancer in a family.  Genetic lab-research relies on quite different tools to those used 
in clinical work, requiring sophisticated computer systems for sequencing and testing 
of genetic material, often across large numbers of research subjects. Boundary work 
therefore does not only demarcate credibility cartographically between disciplines 
and specialisms but also materially.  These technological differences in 
instrumentation are significant because they frame the cancer problem differently 
according to specific spatial and temporal horizons.  The conceptual constitution of 
genetic cancer, in its transition from the laboratory to the clinic, shifts considerably 
and in different ways that help to align experts to the dominant or resistant view. It 
shifts (i) temporally because in the laboratory future cancers are determined 
according to present signifiers, whereas in the clinic they are determined according 
to past events; (ii) by its subject (Michael, 2000) because in the laboratory, future 
cancers are associated with populations whereas in the clinic it is individuals and 
families who are at risk; and (iii) materially because future cancers in the laboratory 
are identified through DNA testing and analytical and biotechnological tools, 
whereas in the clinic future cancers are identified through patient histories and 
associated tools, such as the family tree.  
 
Similarly, in the next extract, cancer is constituted as the interaction of tumour 
behaviour with wider biological processes, which is indicative of the biological 
materials and practices of tissue banking that make up this specialist’s daily 
practices.  These practices inform the experts de-bunking of the utility, validity and 
purpose of identifying those ‘at risk’ and re-asserts the resistant view. 
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I: “We are talking about setting the agenda for research for the next ten, fifteen 
years. We are definitely not talking about a lady with a lump on her breast, 
presents it to her doctor and the doctor actually takes a biopsy...” 
R: “Except, that’s probably the best way to go 'cause a lot of this, sort of trying to 
identify who is going to get... the trouble is you don't know who is going to progress, 
and we're probably actually over treating a lot of patients who do not need to be 
treated 'cause their lesion is just going to sit there, it's not going to grow any further 
and will regress...”  
I: “For a lady who's not actually aware that there is a lump in her breast or that 
there's something in her breast, how can we pick up those?  I’m thinking about 
the non-affected population?” 
R: “I think you've got to be careful how you spend your money.  You could spend a lot 
of time helping nobody with a lot of this research.  It's the same with the genetic 
research…You're not going to have a test like that ever, that is going to work, that 
tells you that patient will get a certain type of cancer, simply because we don't know 
– there's modifiers out there, that certainly reduce your risk as well as increase your 
risk, and we don't know anything about those at all.  There are genes that you 
inherit that stop you getting cancer, and there're very difficult to find in the current 
way we're looking at science, and that's one of things we've not addressed.  I think 
it's something like one in seven women have a breast cancer gene that increases 
their risk, but not everybody gets breast cancer.  So something is wrong 
somewhere.  We're missing part of the equation.” 
 
The interviewer begins by stating: ‘we are definitely not talking about’ those 
who are already symptomatic. In order to attempt to move the interviewer 
away from this particular construction of the cancer problem, the 
interviewee employs a number of performative strategies.  Firstly, they draw 
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upon the uncertainty of current knowledge regarding genetic risk in cancer.  
Uncertainty can both sweeten a bitter prospect or make a sweet prospect 
bitter (Michael, 2000), engendering hope on the one hand and confirming 
limitations on the other (Moreira and Palladino, 2005).  In this case, the 
director of a cancer bank makes the sweet prospect - that of genetic risk 
profiling - bitter, by confirming its limitations and questioning to what end 
the research is conducted.  The present and future uncertainty of cancer risk 
is made a symptom of the ‘current way we’re looking at science’ and 
therefore provides a mechanism through which the boundaries of credibility 
for epistemic authority (Gieryn, 1999) on cancer are redrawn.  This boundary 
work is significant for the building of expectations in this experts’ account, as 
it shifts the locus of legitimacy away from the field of genetic risk and 
towards cellular change.     
 
The conversation continues: 
 
 
I: “This is really what I'm looking for, because using the analogy of normal pre-
cancerous…”  
R: “...But it isn't – it's not that simple.  It's not that simple...” 
I: “...I know – I know it's not” 
R: “You have normal, you have something, I mean, remember the pathologist can only 
identify something when it's there, so it has to be something that is noticeably  
different, which means it must have had a growth spurt, so it's got to be growing 
faster than the cells.  Now what happens next?  That particular lump may have all 
the genes that enable it to invade quickly but it isn't going anywhere.  It's not 
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growing any longer so it's stopped.  It doesn't invade.  You don't know what is pre-
cancerous and what isn't because you never follow it.” (Director of Science Services 
of a large Cancer Bank, Specialist in Breast Cancer) 
 
Once the epistemic credibility over what cancer is is challenged, it is made subject to 
competing claims of expertise.  The director, like the Professor of Oncology and 
Palliative Care, goes on to suggest that information about who is going to get cancer, 
even if its future prediction were feasible, is not as important as knowing which 
cancers are going to progress.   
 
In challenging the constitution of cancer as a known evolving entity in which there is 
a possibility of intervention, the expert claims that the characteristics of those 
tumours which progress to invasive cancers and those that stop growing entirely are 
not yet known (known unknowns): the analogy of the pussycat and the tiger re-
asserts itself.  By doing this, the expert relegates the category ‘pre-cancerous’ to an 
ethereal assumption or a present unknown unknown rather than a measurable 
clinical sign/bio-marker. This makes the problem ‘undo-able’ and shifts the focus of 
attention for future research away from risk prediction and prevention, and towards 
the study of tumour progression over time.  Maintaining that ‘you have to be careful 
about how you spend your money.  You could spend a lot of time helping nobody’, 
the specialist places individual cancer sufferers as the subject of any potential future 
(see Michael, 2000).  Part of the power for the resistant view, unlike the dominant 
view, is that the future subject is not a rational, cold, faceless collective but is, 
instead, made up of individual cancer patients, providing a greater potential for 
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empathy and significant moral resource through which to claim credibility over the 
future of cancer research.   
 
Cancer continuum - population, risk & prediction: The dominant view 
 
The constitution of cancer by the director of the Cancer bank, in which they state 
you can only identify something if an observable lump is present, was different to 
the kinds of research that were currently in fashion, as the interviewer remarks:  
 
“This is actually a very new view of the future agenda, I have to say.  Of all the people I've 
interviewed where breast cancer – they were looking more on the prevention, early 
detection – of average population, rather than just finding out which type of the disease is 
going to be aggressive.” (Interviewer talking during an interview with the director of a 
cancer bank) 
 
Indeed, a central interest for the project team was to bring together epidemiological 
data about lifestyle and environment with genetic, epi-genetic and histopathological 
information to develop a more sophisticated system of risk prediction.  The benefit 
of this technique, in theory, is that it would provide better indicators of risk.  These 
indicators could provide the basis for screening, the facilitation of early diagnosis 
and, most significantly, a pathway to prevention by empowering people to change 
their lifestyle, reducing their risk by a quantifiable amount.  This potential future for 
the field of cancer was echoed by a number of the experts themselves: 
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“I can see a day where you will go into your GP’s surgery and, like you have your blood 
pressure and cholesterol done now, you will have SNP profiling done.  Then it will be a 
predicted marker, so basically we will enter an era I think of predictive medicine.  I’ve no 
doubt at all it’s going to happen…people really do want to have cancer either diagnosed early 
or even better still, if you’re very high risk, be told, well if you take this type of preventative 
action, then it will lower your risk.” (Professor of Oncogenetics, Institute of Cancer 
Research) 
 
The pre-occupation with risk is reflective of a cultural shift occurring in advanced 
liberal societies that constructs uncertain futures as somehow responsive to the 
actions of rational individuals (Groves, 2013), acting on the basis of population 
profiling.  A significant consequence of these socio-cultural dimensions 
simultaneously shaping and being shaped by biomedical science is the way in which 
the future is increasingly constructed as a dimension of the present (Adam and 
Groves, 2007). 
 
This expectation of the future therefore both constitutes and is constituted by a 
particular understanding of cancer itself, making up the dominant view amongst the 
cancer experts interviewed.  Cancer as an object is understood as an evolving entity 
existing along a material and temporal continuum within which intervention is 
possible.  The interviewer (in the previous conversation with the director of the 
cancer bank), draws on the analogy of a continuum from ‘normal to pre-cancerous 
to cancerous cells’, a well-established model in cancer research referred to as the 
stepwise model of cell transformation (Goldstein et al., 2012).  Such an 
understanding of cancer is necessary for a future in which individuals ‘at risk’ can be 
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identified at this ‘pre-cancerous’ stage.  To draw on Fujimura’s (1987) study of basic 
cancer research, this conception of the problem and its subsequent scientific project 
is compelling: there is a clear question and the techniques and technologies (bio-
informatics and genetic profiling) required to answer it are in place.  Moreover it is 
population-wide and not just focussed on individuals.  The attack on the credibility of 
the risk hypothesis provided by the director of a cancer bank that attempted to 
represent the dominant view as an undoable project, is challenged here by the tools 
and information infrastructures that exist to support it.  
 
The interviewer’s interest in building a risk algorithm for the common cancers was 
pursued at various points in all the interviews and was shared, by many experts, as 
representing part of the dominant view. Below the director of a genetics institute 
and the interviewer discuss a more ‘informed’ system of risk prediction: 
 
I: “Are you aware of any study that is trying to come up with any algorithm that is 
trying to combine them together?” 
R: “Not on that kind of scale…but Biobank is the study… it’s a resource that’s being 
established specifically to enable genetic and exposure factors…so you know, 
environmental factors, population factors and so on…to be taken into account when 
looking at the causes of modern diseases.  So it’s exactly how people are thinking.” 
I: “This is the question I am keeping asking and have been looking for in the 
literature, if we say for instance these are the ten risk factors for breast cancer, if 
there is any sort of system to say if I have one, two and three, my risk is 50%, 
while if I have one, five and eight, I am only at the risk of 20%.  What strikes me 
actually just to look at each individual risk factor and they assess it individually.  
So yes, I’m happy to give up for instance chocolate or alcohol, or whatever aspect 
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of my lifestyle that is unhealthy, but what’s the price for that?  Does this lower my 
risk by 10%, by 20%, by 80%?”  (Director of Institute for Medical Genetics, 
Specialist in Lung Cancer) 
   
The interviewer describes their own understanding of risk prediction. This type of 
prediction is reliant on better quality information, knowledge of clinical indicators 
that impart risk, better utilisation of information through standardised procedures 
for recording, and better mechanisms for mining data. Together, it is hoped, this will 
provide a more informed and balanced account of an individual’s overall risk.    
 
“If we are going to get into prevention, then there is a whole load of more information that 
we need because you need to know about the lifestyle of the patient, you need to know a lot 
of details about dietary information and if you are going to start to get into trying to lower 
the risk of, say, getting breast cancer, okay..  At the moment, it’s all a bit…you know, genetics 
is all in one part and the general practitioners in another part…it’s not integrated.” 
(Consultant Clinical Oncologist, Specialist in Breast Cancer) 
 
The building of such an algorithm requires future commitment to the development 
of more integrated and powerful information systems and infrastructures in order to 
allow the dominant view, of cancer risk prediction and prevention, to unfold.  This 
example highlights the ways in which present ways of thinking and doing in cancer 
research form the basis for future plans and prospects.  Expectations, in this case, 
are built upon instrumental rather than utopian ideas of the future (Brown, 2000).  
 
Moments of contention  
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Indicating the tremendous challenge facing the project team in their quest for 
consensus, it is important to highlight that resistances were also evident in 
interviews with experts expressing the dominant view.  In this sense, the dominant 
and the resistant view are akin to Weber’s ideal type (Bruun, 2012). In the next 
extract, a professor of cancer pathology describes their own interest in the 
identification of risk.  However, it is quite different to the information-driven risk of 
interest to the interviewer and, subsequently, offers less opportunity for workable 
solutions: 
 
R “That these lesions have both pre-cursor and risk status and people are getting 
more and more to the view that these are true pre-cursor lesions and I’d certainly 
have that view” 
I: “So, the typical hyperplasia patients.  If now we are, I wouldn’t say 100%, but we 
are more or less sure it is a pre-cancerous condition.” 
R: “Yes.” 
I: “So what sort of follow up observation and surveillance would we offer?” 
R: “Well… those patients would go into our follow up clinic, so that we would offer 
them yearly surveillance.” 
I: “What, this is here?” 
R: “This is here, yes.” 
I: “Is there anything on a national level?” 
R: “No.  I’ve lobbied – the national policy is purely around genetic risk and I’ve argued 
through the College of Pathologists, to NICE that they should be looking at 
histological risks as well, but they haven’t. I think that’s wrong personally.”  
(Professor of Cancer Pathology, Specialist in Breast Cancer) 
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The materiality of the histological risk that the expert describes helps re-affirm the 
interviewer’s analogy of cancer as an evolving entity with a pre-cancerous stage, 
amenable to intervention.  The future, amongst the dominant view, is therefore 
concerned with future futures: a future in which the future is more malleable, 
controllable and preventable.  Lowy (2007) describes the often neglected similarities 
of predictive tests grounded in the analysis of DNA sequences and those grounded in 
cytological observations, noting that they are both concerned with risk assessment 
of a-symptomatic patients and that the conceptual framing of such risk is shaped by 
the materiality of the expert’s practice.   
 
The tensions and resistances arise in the correlation between histological data and 
clinical meaning.  The barriers experienced by this cancer pathologist in their 
attempts to include histological risk in the development of a screening programme 
reflects such difficulties in identifying ‘pre-cursor’ legions: 
 
“So you could theoretically prevent all of those breast cancers, because the evidence from 
the P1 study, was that they are hormonally dependant and you will suppress their growth 
and development and the risk, if you offer a hormonal intervention.  The problem is finding 
those patients, because it’s not easy to detect these low – they’re tiny, the microscopic 
lesions, you can’t see them easily on mammograms, … some patients will be detectable on 
mammograms, but it’s very, very rare to detect that and so in terms of identifying the 
patients, you’re going to miss lots of them, because you can’t see them, you can’t find them, 
there isn’t a strategy to do them.” (Professor of Cancer Pathology, Specialist in Breast 
Cancer) 
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The clinical implications for cancer treatment as a result of identifying these pre-
cursor legions are enormously complex.  Although the current consensus in 
pathology, according to the expert, suggests that legions such as ductal carcinoma in 
situ (DCIS) are a stage in the development of invasive cancer, strengthening the view 
that they are pre-cancerous, they are almost impossible to detect in a clinical 
context. The establishment of cancer as a continuum from abnormal cells, through 
to pre-cancerous cells and then to cancerous cells, constituted by the dominant 
view, is made credible on the basis of ‘cartographical’ (Gieryn, 1999) boundary work.  
In other words, the material manifestation of the ‘pre-cancerous’ legion in the 
account of a histopathologist stretches the biological pathway of cancer towards the 
pre-symptomatic population. Bringing these materials together with the 
technological advances in information infrastructures creates new knowledge 
through which future risk becomes increasingly more certain in the lives of people’s 
present. 
 
Despite being asked to speculate about futures unrestricted by borders, experts 
offered futures with caveats, contingencies and uncertainties. These resistances 
reflect the complex dynamics of expectations in biomedical science, that not only 
represent hope and promissory futures, but are also marred by ambiguity and 
uncertainty (Fitzgerald 2014), as illustrated in a growing literature on the sociology of 
low expectations (Pikersgill 2011; Tutton 2011).  What this work illustrates are the 
ways in which experts negotiate an ‘intermediate terrain’, as Fitzgerald (2014) 
describes it, between hope and promise on the one hand and ambiguity and 
uncertainty on the other.  In the context of these interviews, where experts are 
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making claims to the future of the field of cancer research, the oscillations between 
low and high expectations are a resource through which experts are able to secure 
knowledge regarding the constitution of cancer, while highlighting the caveats and 
uncertainties of others.  Low expectations – or ambiguity and uncertainty – 
accounted for within their own fields of expertise are described as important points 
of complexity that require further thought and investigation (that should be 
undertaken by them and others in their particular field of expertise), in order to 
understand the cancer problem. 
 
These ‘moments of contention’ between the interviewing team and the expert 
participants can partly be explained by the expert’s proximity to direct clinical 
practice or to the frontline of cancer research; the socio-spatial dimension of 
expectations.  It is well rehearsed within science and technology studies that the 
closer you are to knowledge production in a field, the more you are able to see the 
contingencies that shape the production of ‘facts’.  Distance, on the other hand, 
lends enchantment (Collins, 1997) as those further from the frontline of clinical work 
or biomedical research are more shielded from the complexities of scientific and 
clinical practice and thus able to maintain a degree of certainty over the production 
of the same ‘facts’ (Brown and Michael, 2003; Borup et al., 2006; Collins, 1997; 1999; 
MacKenzie, 1990; 1998). Such contingencies and uncertainties are arguably even 
more evident in discussions and speculations of what might be, and the relationship 
between what we ‘know’ and ‘don’t yet know’.  
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Taking in to account the spatial (the degree of closeness to research at the front line) 
and cartographical (the demarcations made between groups of experts that make 
claims to knowledge) organisation of expectations, it is not surprising that the 
experts and the interviewer experience moments of contention.  As an actor at some 
remove from the coalface of research, the interviewer is more ready to treat 
emergent findings from the ‘core set’ as facts, particularly when such ideas align 
with the current available resources of knowledge, skills, equipment and 
technologies that provide the basis for a ‘do-able project’ (Fujimura, 1987).  
Furthermore, the conceptual and epistemic aspects of the cancer problem shape and 
are simultaneously shaped by the available personnel, technological equipment, and 
resources that Fujimura identifies.  In extending Fujimura’s (1987) argument, this 
work shows the significance of the relationship between these factors for building a 
do-able project and creating a consensus to build a workable future solution.   
 
In a conversation between a research geneticist and the interviewer, a discussion 
emerges about single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs). The interviewer, in seeking 
out measurable clinical indicators, asks about their future utility in light of what they 
describe as the problem of ‘specificity’: 
 
I:  “But the way I understand it, it’s not just looking at, okay, this particular SNP is 
predisposing or making you susceptible to bowel cancer and breast cancer, for 
instance… it’s comprised of the many combinations of many SNPs together.  So 
would this be able to tell us, in about five years’ time or more… that yes, its breast 
cancer, nothing else?  The reason I am asking this is because of… something like 
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the PSA (prostate specific antigen) for instance.  Yes, PSA is for prostatic cancer 
but it’s not specific to the prostatic cancer.”  
R: “No!” 
I:  “Are we going to spend all this effort to come up with something that is really not 
specific…?” 
R: “Yeah, probably…well, some of them will be specific and some of them won’t be, I 
imagine, because that’s the nature of the gene changes.  So the gene changes for 
HNPCC (Hereditary Non-Polyposis Colorectal Cancer) register as predisposal for 
colon cancer…and register as predisposal for lots of other cancers as well!  And 
already, as I’ve said, SNPs have been identified that predispose to more than one 
type of cancer…but then others will only be relevant to specific tissue! So yeah, it 
will be a combination of different SNPs to different disorders and some of them will 
overlap and some won’t…but SNPs aren’t the be all and end all of genetic 
susceptibility, you know…there are other types of gene variations, in addition to 
SNPs, that are important.  They’ll only account for a fraction of the genetic 
susceptibility.” (Director of Institution for Medical Genetics, Specialist in Lung 
Cancer) 
 
The geneticist responds to the challenge put forward by the interviewer by shifting 
attention away from focussing only on SNPs, to understanding SNPs in the context of 
other genetic variations.  This ‘moment of contention’ reflects the socio-spatial 
dimension of expectations; the geneticist is much more inclined to maintain caveats 
and to make corrections to the more instrumental interpretations of the interviewer.  
However, while accounting for uncertainty and caveats, the expert also carefully 
manages expectations to ensure investment in genetic research as a credible future 
path for the cancer field (Arribas-Allyon et al., 2010). Given the context of failures 
and delays (see Morrison, 2012), justification for the ‘basic to applied model’ of 
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biomedical research has become a key component in expectations discourse for 
biomedical science.  In contrast, the interviewer focusses on the potential of SNP’s to 
provide clinical indicators.  To develop workable solutions to the cancer problem, 
through the utilisation of information systems, clinical information must be ‘specific’.    
 
Similarly, the future potential of generating sophisticated risk algorithms that link 
together genetic, histopathological, environmental and lifestyle data necessitates 
clear relationships between the common cancers and identifiable risk factors.  As the 
director of a cancer bank describes, the evidence for the effect of lifestyle on breast 
cancer, for example, is uncertain: 
 
R: “We can change behaviour to a certain extent but there will always be somebody 
who will ignore that advice...” 
I: “This is a question actually that keeps coming in every single interview I've done –
all types of cancer I'm looking at, like the heart diseases, you have an algorithm to 
say, if you have these ten risk factors, if you don't want to heart failure at forty….” 
R: “Yeah.” 
I: “In cancer, you always get someone who says actually I'm ready to give up my red 
meat and my fatty food and my chocolate if this lowers my risk by twenty per 
cent, but you can't really say precisely...” 
R: “You can't say that....and – and plus the fact that an awful lot of the evidence is 
contradictory… A colleague told me that at a meeting he'd been to where one of the 
big breast cancer people in the States said that alcohol was bad for you and the 
journal of clinical oncology, top oncology journal, this week, big paper by the group 
at Cambridge, highly respected saying, alcohol is not bad for you.  It does not 
increase your risk of breast cancer, so when you have conflicting evidence like that 
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coming from top groups of Epidemiologists, nobody's going to listen...” (Director of 
Science Services of a large Cancer Bank, Specialist in Breast Cancer) 
 
The issue of the relationship between lifestyle and cancer risk is a distinct point of 
disagreement in current cancer research.  The interviewee in this extract, a 
supporter of the resistant view, highlights disagreements amongst experts working 
in the field of cancer risk and lifestyle change to attempt to enrol support for their 
point of view (see Hedgecoe, 2006), by questioning the validity of a thesis which 
contains contradictory evidence.  Not only is the resistant view said to be more 
concrete and tangible, there are less disagreements amongst it advocates. The 
dominant view –researching pre-symptomatic risk - exists as a present unknown and 
is therefore presented as posing significant challenges for providing future promise.  
 
Those experts who championed the work of differentiating the ‘tigers’ from the 
‘pussycats’ – the resistant view, take seriously this contested terrain and highlight 
some the uncertainties and assumptions that underpin it.  These resistant voices 
within the ‘core-set’ however, still contribute to the overall progression of the 
dominant view.  By championing the place of histopathological change in the 
development of large-scale, long-term studies that includes human tissue samples 
and their study over time, alongside genetic, environmental and lifestyle data; they 
become enrolled in the dominant view hypothesis of ‘cancer of a continuum’ with 
tumour development becoming an additional developing risk factor.  This enrolment 
of the resistant view is partly accomplished through the instrumental rationality 
(Michael, 2000) of cancer research futures, highlighted in many of the experts’ 
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accounts, that tend to be determined by the means and methods of knowledge 
production that exist in the present.  What cancer is and its implications becomes 
subsumed by the strategies, resources and expertise required to do cancer research.   
 
Building future value  
 
Expectations of future success are also central to the construction of economic value 
(Martin, 2015).  In discussing potential futures experts refer to the ‘efficiency’ of 
targeting a population, while advising frugality in not putting ‘all your money there’, 
given the limited signs of future success.  Some even drew on a betting analogy, ‘the 
safe bet’ or the ‘sure winner’ in their attempts to make some future projects more 
‘doable’ than others.  This language reflects, at least rhetorically, a shift in the public 
performance of success in biomedical research away from scientific discovery and 
the development of new knowledge, and towards scientific breakthrough and a 
solution to a current, well defined problem (see Brown, 2000).  The way in which 
cancer, as a present problem, is constituted is therefore important. The boundary 
work undertaken to define the problem will determine which knowledge is able to 
obtain value and ultimately will be rewarded. The dominant and resistant views, in 
constituting the cancer problem, therefore have significant implications for the 
evaluation of future success in cancer research.  Once the cancer problem is 
constituted, it is possible to identify the model required to solve it and make a case 
for the types of expertise essential for this future to unfold:   
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I: “And who do you think would be the stakeholders in producing this model?  
Definitely I can see now pathology, the community medicine, so what are the 
other and the genetics of course.  Who do you think would be the stakeholders in 
the main players?” 
R: “Well you need sort of academiologists, they’re going to be absolutely and they’re 
the ones who have all the lifestyle information.  [You] need people like [expert in 
cancer genetics] and [expert in cancer genetics] who have got the molecular genetic 
sort of information to link to lifestyle.  It’s combining those two things.  I’d put a 
plea in for pathology, because I’m a pathologist, but we understand the sort of 
early… things that are going on, so we can feed that sort of knowledge in there and I 
suppose there is the main sort of people, I would put the community medicine sided 
within this and epidemiologist in particular.” (Professor of Cancer Pathology, 
Specialist in Breast Cancer) 
 
Sometimes moments of contention lead to moments of consensus. The interviewer 
and interviewee are engaged in negotiations over what combination of disciplinary 
skills and expertise are required to fulfil future needs, making explicit the networks 
of innovation necessary for the future (Borup et. al., 2006). While doing this, the 
expert ensures the role of pathology is recognised.  In all conversations presented in 
this article, experts are staking a claim to the future of cancer research by employing 
various strategies: constituting cancer according to specific technologies or materials 
that are presented as being paramount to its understanding; drawing on different 
types of future subjects; or, making recourse to unknowns, uncertainties or 
controversies.  In some moments, claims to a particular kind of future are more 
explicit than others, highlighting what’s really at stake in these conversations: to 
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secure and mobilise resources across scientific communities, which has implications 
for research institutions, research centres, careers, jobs. 
 
Discussion 
 
This article brings into view expectations in-the-making of the core-set in the 
development of UK cancer research.  The accounts described are, by their nature, 
specific to a particular point in time, reflecting the trajectory of cancer science during 
the late noughties, with future projections framed by the thinking, debates, 
technologies and infrastructures of a specific time and place.  Expectations are, of 
course, contingent upon the contexts and situations in which they are produced.  
The future of cancer research may be accounted for in various ways across local, 
national and international networks or communities of practice.  For example, the 
constitution of cancer and the future of the research field may be performed 
differently by experts in conversations amongst themselves, when talking to patient 
and relative groups or when presenting their case to policy makers and international 
funding bodies (see for example Kerr et al 2007 which accounts for ambivalences in 
cancer professionals’ accounts with regard to developments in genetic research). 
 
Taking account of the contexts and contingencies, representations of the future 
matter. They matter because of the ways in which social constructions of the future 
can have a self-fulfilling affect (Merton, 1951), but also because, in their 
performative character (Michael, 2000 building on Mead), they script the present 
(Akrich, 1993).  Investing in certain kinds of futures over others is therefore a 
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political act with significant repercussions for those working in the area, and for 
those that cancer might effect, in the future and the present.   
 
The contribution of this paper is to illustrate how claims to authority rely on spatial, 
temporal, material and cartographical demarcation.  Expectations of the future are 
therefore shown to rely on various forms of boundary work (Gieryn, 1999)  to add 
legitimacy to experts explanations of what cancer is, subsequently lending credibility 
to experts’ future predictions for cancer research, both in terms of what ought to 
happen, to ensure scientific breakthroughs, but also what is meaningful, feasible and 
possible for the future.   
 
Boundary work is shown to be an essential part of constituting cancer as an entity, 
playing a central role in shaping future expectations of cancer research.  For the 
experts, the interviewer and the research team, such questions have important 
implications for the mobilisation of resources determining their own present 
credibility in contributing to knowledge in the field, and their capacity to secure 
future employment and continued career development. 
 
Contested terrain in the field of cancer research has been shown to be triggered by a 
number of factors: an expert’s connection to a particular technical or theoretical 
view – style of reasoning (Hacking, 1992); and what approach provides the greatest 
potential to form a ‘do-able’ project, accounted for on the basis of robust knowledge 
and epistemic authority on the one hand or practical tools, resources and 
infrastructures on the other (Fujimura, 1987).   Others have highlighted the potency 
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and persuasiveness of risk prediction across a number of fields in contemporary 
society (Groves, 2013).  In the case of these experts, risk prediction remains central 
to their claim-making regarding the future of cancer research, in a similar vein to 
that of genetic susceptibility (which so far has also offered little meaningful 
improvement in determining someone’s risk in the clinic).  Perhaps the draw of the 
dominant view is not only its potential to form a do-able project, but also its 
alignment to broader cultural pre-occupations with ‘risk thinking’ (Rose, 1999) and 
the curtailment of future indeterminacy (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1998).   
 
As the conversations presented in this article show, the overall paradigm of the 
‘basic to applied model’ remains strong, albeit with shifted parameters of what kinds 
of new knowledge are necessary for success.  The difficulty is, that developing 
greater knowledge at this base level may actually increase complexity, as illustrated 
in many of the experts’ accounts, leading to less prognostic and diagnostic certainty 
(Lowy and Gaudielliere, 2008).
4
  The instrumental nature of cancer futures 
represented in these expert accounts, where existing ways of thinking, 
infrastructures and resources shape the futures that are enacted, suggest that the 
pussycats and tigers (and their critique of detection, risk and prediction) may be 
subsumed within the potent and persuasive framework of the dominant view - as a 
‘do-able project’ with a greater potential payoff, quietening the roars (and the purrs) 
for more targeted, more effective and safer treatments for those who have cancer.  
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1 Gieryn (1994) uses the concept of cartography to describe the mapping of epistemic 
authority on the basis of credible methods or reliable facts, with borders that locate useful 
science, that are surrounded by less useful terrain.  This idea helps to describe the spatial, 
material and ontological demarcation that occurs in the accounts and interactions of cancer 
research experts. 
2 Aligned to the concern over pussycats and tigers, although not fully explored in this 
expert’s description, is the problem of ‘lead time biases’.  This refers to the length of time a 
‘cancer’ has been detected but causes no harm, with earlier detection potentially creating 
years of anxiety (Etzioni et al., 2002).      
3
 Jane Calvert’s (2006; 2009) work on systems biology is useful to illustrate the engineer’s 
approach to biology. 
4 Futures not represented in these accounts include the potential human impact of over-
diagnoses (Etzioni et al., 2002) that fail to provide useful categories for clinical intervention 
(Welch, 2004; Black, 2000; Folkmon and Kalluri, 2004).  Such futures may have provided 
greater credibility to the resistant view and further challenged the paradigm of early 
detection and prevention.   
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